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JURISDICTION! NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from a District Court review of a final 
order of the Department of Social Services, a State Agency. 
It was originally filed in the Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah, which later transferred the case to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
This Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2 ) (a) (Supp. 1986). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
When a decree of divorce awarding custody of the children 
to the mother is silent with regard to her child support obligation, 
and she later relinquishes custody of the children to the father 
without obtaining a modification of the decree to that effect, 
and the father receives public assistance for the children, 
is there a "court order" for purposes of determining whether 
the Department of Social Services may use administrative proceedings 
to assess the mother with a support obligation? 
STATUTE WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
This case turns on the interpretation of the first six 
words of Utah Code Ann. §78-45b-5(l) (1953), as amended, which 
reads as follows in pertinent part: 
In the absence of a court order, the director 
may issue a notice of support debt accrued or 
accruing based upon the furnishing of support 
by the department for the benefit of any 
dependent child. . . . (Emphasis added) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State agrees with appellant's Statement of the Case, 
but adds the following relevant point: 
1. Judge Timothy R. Hanson signed an Order on August 
29, 1986, affirming the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law of the Administrative Law Judge, and affirming the Order 
of the Department of Social Services. (R. 87-88). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The State agrees with appellant's Statement of Facts, except 
as noted below: 
1. Appellant states that "The Decree does not obligate 
the Petitioner to pay any child support to Mr. Hutchinson." 
(Appellant's Brief, P. 2). This is a true statement; however, 
it may imply that the Decree affirmatively provided that appellant 
(the "mother") had no child support obligation. Such an implication 
would be incorrect. It is more accurate to state that the Decree 
was silent on the subject of the mother's child support obliga-
tion. (R. 34-35). 
2. In addition to finding the mother legally obligated 
under the Public Support of Children Act to reimburse the Department 
for child support, the Administrative Law Judge found that she 
was also so obligated under common law principles. (R. 39-41). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Public Support of Children Act (Utah Code Ann. §78-45b-l 
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to 24 (1953) , as amended) provides an administrative procedure 
for assessing and collecting child support obligations. When 
applicable, it provides a relatively expeditious alternative 
to judicial proceedings, and it has a built-in judicial review 
procedure should an aggrieved party request it. 
When there is an existing court order, the Act authorizes 
the Department of Social Services to enforce that order by collecting 
the child support obligation established by the order. 
On the other hand, in the absence of a court order, the 
Department is authorized to actually establish a child support 
obligation (in accordance with certain specific statutory guide-
lines), and to enforce that obligation. The determination of 
the Department is subject to judicial review. 
The authority of the Department to establish a support 
obligation hinges on whether or not there is a "court order." 
The State respectfully submits that under the facts of this 
case, there was no court order as contemplated by Utah Code 
Ann. S73-45b-5(l) (1953), as amended. 
In this case, the Decree of Divorce said nothing about 
the mother's child support obligation, and understandably so, 
because she had custody of both of the children. There was 
no need for the Decree to deal with the issue of her child support 
obligation, so it was totally silent on that point and made 
no order one way or the other on that subject. 
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For that reason, when the custody of the children was informally 
switched to the father of the children, and he began receiving 
public assistance, it was perfectly appropriate for the Department 
to proceed administratively to "fill in the gap" left in the 
Decree and to establish the mother's support obligation. 
Appellant's brief, assuming almost without argument that 
there was a "court order" in this case, focuses on other points 
that are secondary and unnecessary for a determination of this 
case. Once this Court makes its decision regarding whether 
or not there was a "court order" in this case, appellant's arguments 
will become moot. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE DECISIVE ISSUE IN THIS CASE IS WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS 
A "COURT ORDER" AS CONTEMPLATED BY UTAH CODE ANN. §78-45b-5(l) 
(1953) AS AMENDED. THE DETERMINATION OF THAT ISSUE WILL BE 
DISPOSITIVE OF THE APPEAL. 
This appeal turns on the interpretation of Utah Code Ann. 
§78-45b~5(l) (1953), as amended, which provides that "in the 
absence of a court order," the Department of Social Services 
may use its administrative procedures to establish and enforce 
the subject parent's child support obligation. If this court 
determines that there was a court order in this case, then the 
State clearly acted incorrectly and the Order of the Department 
of Social Services must be set aside. 
If, however, this Court sustains the reasoning of the Admini-
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strative Law Judge and of the District Court, and finds that 
there was no court order as contemplated by Utah Code Ann. §78-45b-5 
(1953), as amended, then the action of the Department of Social 
Services should be upheld. 
Appellant gives short shrift to the question of whether 
or not there was a "court order." She does not even set it 
out as an issue in the case. Instead, her argument begs the 
question by making the unsupported assumption that "The Petitioner's 
duty of child support has been fixed, an order exists, and the 
issue is res judicata." (Appellant's Brief, P. 5). Using that 
assumed premise as a starting point, she then makes three main 
conclusions, which may be summarized as follows: 
(1) Where there is a court order fixing a support obligation, 
that order is res judicata (subject, of course, to appropriate 
judicial modification); 
(2) A court-ordered support obligation cannot be modified 
in administrative proceedings; and 
(3) A support order cannot be modified retroactively. 
The State acknowledges that these three main points, as described 
above, are accurate statements of existing Utah law. It is 
inappropriate to consider those three points, however, until 
this Court determines the validity of appellant's initial premise 
that there was a "court order." If her assumption on that 
premise is sustained by this court, then on the basis of her 
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three conclusions described above, she must prevail on the appeal 
and the administrative action of the Department of Social Services 
must be set aside. 
Iff however, her premise fails, then her three conclusions 
do not apply, because the premise on which they are based (a 
"court order") does not exist. Her entire appeal then fails 
because the condition required by statute for the Department's 
administrative action (the "absence of a court order") was satisfied 
and the Department's action should be sustained. 
Since it is the premise of appellant's argument, then, 
that is decisive of the appeal, this brief deals primarily with 
that premise. 
POINT, TWO 
WHEN A DECREE OF DIVORCE IS SILENT WITH REGARD TO THE CHILD 
SUPPORT OBLIGATION OF A CUSTODIAL PARENT, THERE IS NO "COURT 
ORDER" AS CONTEMPLATED BY UTAH CODE ANN. S78-45b-5(l) (1953), 
AS AMENDED AND THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES MAY ESTABLISH 
THAT PARENT'S SUPPORT OBLIGATION USING ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES. 
There is sound reasoning for adopting the proposition that 
in a case like this one, there really is no "court order" as 
contemplated by Utah Code Ann. §78-45b-5(l) (1953), as amended, 
and the use of administrative procedures to establish the support 
obligation is proper. 
The Public Support of Children Act begins by setting forth 
some specific "legislative intent" language. It states that: 
It is declared to be the public policy of 
this state that this chapter be liberally 
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construed and administered to the end that 
children shall be maintained from the 
resources of responsible parents, thereby 
relieving or avoiding, at least in part, 
the burden often borne by the general 
citizenry through welfare programs. 
Utah Code Ann. $78-45b-l.l (1953), as amended. In the following 
section, the term "Court order" is defined as: 
. . . any judgment or order of any district 
court of this state . . . ordering payment of 
a set or determinable amount of support money. 
Utah Code Ann. $78-45b-2(3) (Supp.1986). It is in the "absence" 
of such an order that the Department of Social Services is authorized 
to administratively establish a parent's support obligation. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45b-5(l) (1953), as amended. 
Appellant asserts that the above-quoted statutes mean that 
if there is any order dealing with the support obligation of 
any party, then the Department is barred from administratively 
establishing the support obligation of a parent, even if the 
order doesn't say anything about tjfrat. parent' s support obligation. 
(Since most divorce decrees do not make any affirmative statements 
regarding the support obligations, or lack thereof, of custodial 
parents, appellant's analysis would mean that Utah Code Ann. 
$78-45b-5 (1953), as amended, would probably never apply in 
any divorce case.) She claims that gilence in the decree regarding 
the custodial parent's support obligation should be construed 
as an affirmative determination that the custodial parent does 
not have any child support obligation. 
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Although the State acknowledges that appellants broad 
reading of the definition of "court order" is plausible, it 
submits that a more narrow reading is not only equally plausible, 
but better serves the stated legislative intent and accomplishes 
the public policies involved. 
The State suggests that the better interpretation of the 
above-quoted statutes is as follows: In cases where the issue 
of the child support obligation of the subject parent has clearly 
come before the court, and some inference of the court's determi-
nation regarding that support obligation may be made from the 
courtfs order, then,there is a court order covering the subject 
parent's child support obligation and the Department has no 
authority to take any action other than enforcement of that 
order. For example, if the court has specifically defined the 
support obligation of the subject parent, or has specifically 
reserved that parent's child support obligation for future judicial 
determination, or has given custody of a child to one parent 
and not assigned a child support obligation to the other parent 
regarding that child, then there can be no doubt but that the 
court was faced with the issue of the child support obligation 
of the non-custodial parent and dealt with it in its order. 
In other cases, such as the case at hand, where the Decree 
is totally silent and the court has not really dealt with the 
subject parent's support obligation, there should be no objection 
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to establishing that obligation through administrative procedures. 
In such a case, the Department of Social Services is not encroaching 
on the province of the court, but is rather assisting the court 
by filling in a gap which the court had not previously addressed. 
The Administrative Law Judge clearly had this understanding 
of the law when he stated in his Conclusions of Law that: 
Without doubtf the defendant [the mother] 
has both a common law and statutory obligation 
to support her children which, for the purposes 
of this proceeding, is neither,reduced nor 
eliminated by whatever Jflfly be implied from 
the language of the parties1 Divorce Decree. 
(Emphasis added) 
(R. 41). The Administrative Law Judge was simply trying to 
make a determination, in accordance with his statutory authority, 
regarding something that had not even come before the trial 
court at the time of the divorce. 
Appellant's claim that judicial silence in the Decree of 
Divorce in this case is tantamount to an affirmative order fixing 
her support obligation at zero dollars per month per child is 
incorrect. It is not uncommon in judicial rulings for the court 
not to address certain issues, either because they were not 
raised by the parties or because they were not necessary to 
a determination of the case. The silence of the court regarding 
such issues certainly should not be interpreted as a ruling 
on their merits; all it means is that it was unnecessary for 
the court to say anything about them. 
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Similarly, in the case at hand, the silence of the court 
in the Decree of Divorce regarding the mother's support obligation 
should more properly be viewed as inaction on the part of the 
court regarding that issue. At the time of the Decree no action 
was necessary regarding the mother's support obligation, so 
none was taken. Now, because of the informal change of custody, 
that absence of any specific order now needs to be filled, and 
that is where Utah Code Ann. §78-45b-5 (1953), as amended, comes 
into play, giving the Department the opportunity to expeditiously 
establish the mother's obligation. 
A careful review of Utah Code Ann. S78-45b-5(l) (1953), 
as amended, and the legislative intent surrounding the enactment 
of the Public Support of Children Act thus provides support 
for interpreting that statute so as to provide maximum use of 
the administrative procedures of the Department of Social Services 
in assessing child support obligations. 
In addition, as a matter of sound public policy, the use 
of the administrative process allows child support obligations 
to be established and enforced in a relatively speedy, inexpensive, 
and efficient manner. Since child support needs are ever-changing, 
it is hard for the courts to keep up with the load of such cases. 
It is helpful to have the administrative process available as 
an alternative procedure (as long, of course, as it is not used 
in situations where it would infringe upon jurisdiction reserved 
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for the courts). The Department of Social Services is staffed 
by trained child support specialists and is governed by strict 
policy guidelines to ensure fair and equitable treatment of 
child support obligors. And, above all, its determinations 
are always subject to judicial review should any aggrieved party 
request it. Utah Code Ann. §78-45b-6.1(2) (Supp. 1986). 
The State acknowledges the recent case of Karjen vs. .State 
Department of Social Services, 716 P.2d 810 (Utah 1986), cited 
by appellant. That case, however, has a different factual and 
procedural posture from the case at hand and, for that reason, 
it is not controlling. 
In Karren, the trial court had ordered that custody of 
the three children be split between the mother and the father, 
with the father having two of the children. Under such facts, 
the court at the time of the divorce was clearly presented with 
the question of what obligation, if any, the mother should have 
for the children not in her custody. The court determined that 
the father should pay the mother $30.00 per week for the support 
of the child in her custody, and did not obligate her to pay 
support for the two children in his custody. Later, the court 
modified its order and abated the father's duty to pay child 
support to the mother. No support obligation was imposed on 
the mother. Even though the orders may have been silent regarding 
the mother's support obligation, the circumstances of the case 
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placed the issue of her support obligation squarely before the 
court. Subsequent to the entry of the decree and the order 
modifying the decree, the Department of Social Services entered 
an administrative order establishing a support obligation on 
the part of the mother. 
Under those facts, the Supreme Court held that there was 
a previous court order regarding the mother's support obligation, 
leaving the Department without authority to take such administrative 
action. The court held: "Thus, DSS [Department of Social Services] 
may not redetermine plaintiff's support obligation through an 
administrative proceeding." Karren, at p. 813. 
The present case is distinguishable from K^rrep. No split 
custody arrangement was before the court. It was a simple "Mother 
gets the kids, Father pays child support" situation. The mother's 
support obligation was not even an issue. It is an exagger-
ation to say that the court made any determination regarding 
her support obligation — that issue simply was not dealt with, 
and the basis for the holding in the Kajrep case does not exist 
here. 
It is appropriate for the State to discuss the case of 
St.ett.ler v, Stettle.J, 713 P.2d 699 (Utah 1985), which was not 
cited by appellant, but was referred in the Karren case. Stettler 
is also factually and procedurally distinguishable from the 
present case. 
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In Stettler, the Supreme Court was faced with a case involving 
private parties only. The State was not a party, as it is in 
the present case. At issue was the interpretation of Utah Code 
Ann. §78-45-7(3) (Supp. 1984), which establishes the method 
to be applied by cour.t.s in assessing child support arrearages 
"when no prior court order exists." That statute does not apply 
in the present case, which involves agency action, not court 
action. 
In Stettler, the father was initially awarded custody of 
all three children, and the mother was required to pay him child 
support. Later, pursuant to stipulation of the parties, the 
court ordered a change of custody, awarding the mother custody 
of one of the children, but not requiring the father to pay 
any support to the mother. 
A few months later the mother petitioned the court for 
a further modification, awarding her ongoing child support plus 
arrearages .from the time jghe_obtained, custody of .the one .child. 
The Supreme Court held that the mother was barred from collecting 
arrearages because there was a prior court order dealing with 
the support obligation for that child. The Supreme Court appears 
to have been strongly influenced by the fact that the mother 
had entered into an express stipulation and modified the divorce 
decree to provide for a change of custody, and had omitted any 
change in the child support provisions. The Court stated that: 
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This Court will not now remake the parties1 
agreement and require respondent [the father] 
to contribute to Robyn's support for the 
contested period, when the parties themselves, 
in their stipulation, did not see fit to 
include it. 
Stettler, at p. 703. 
In the present case, not only is the court faced with the 
interpretation of a different statute than that involved in 
Stettler, but a third party (the State of Utah) is involved 
which was not privy to the earlier divorce proceedings between 
the father and mother. Although it may have been fair and equitable 
for the Supreme Court to bind Mrs. Stettler to the modification 
order which .she had been a party, to and had even stipulated 
to, and to find that there was a sufficient court order to bar 
her from receiving arrearages under Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7(3), 
(Supp. 1984), the interpretation of that statute in the Stettler 
case does not control the interpretation of Utah Code Annotated 
§78-45b-5(l) (1953), as amended, in this case. The latter statute 
clearly gives the state rights to reimbursement of child support 
which are independent of any rights belonging to the parent 
receiving the public support. It provides that the state may 
serve a notice of support debt which shall include: 
. . . a statement of the support debt 
accrued or accruing, computable on the 
basis of the amount .of, assistance paid 
or to be paid . . . a demand for immediate 
payment of the support debt or in the 
alternative for a written answer . . .setting 
forth any claimed defenses . . . and 
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a statement that if neither answer nor full 
payment are received within twenty days from 
the date of service the department may assess and 
determine that support debt. . . . 
(Emphasis added) 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45b-5 (1953), as amended. The focus of 
the above-quoted statute is on obtaining reimbursement of public 
assistance paid by the State when there is no "court order," 
and the State's rights in this case are not dependent on those 
of appellant's ex-husband. The State is a real party in interest 
acting in its own behalf. Utah Code Ann. §78-45b-3(2) (Supp. 1986). 
The State submits that until there was a court order clearly 
dealing with the jnothegVs support .QbjLigatjlQji in one way or another, 
she had a general duty to support her children. Utah Code Ann. 
§78-45-4 (1953), as amended, provides that "Every woman shall 
support her child. . . . " The case of In. re „C, J.U., 660 P.2d 
237 (Utah 1983) holds that parents are "duty bound" to support 
their children and that such duty of support is general in nature 
unless and until it becomes circumscribed by a more specific 
duty imposed by the court. Since there was no such court order 
in this case, the Department of Social Services was authorized 
to administratively define that support obligation and to require 
appellant to reimburse the taxpayers of Utah, at least in part, 
for the public support given to her children, and to thereby 
accomplish the intent of the legislature in adopting the Public 
Support of Children Act. 
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POINT THREE 
THE MATTER OF APPELLANT'S CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION IS NOT RES 
JUDICATA. 
For the reasons stated above, the State submits that prior 
to the administrative action taken in this case, there was no 
court order in existence regarding appellant's support obligation. 
The principle of res judicata is therefore inapplicable, and 
the Department of Social Services acted properly in taking admin-
istrative action to assess appellant's child support obligation. 
The arguments set out in Point I of appellant's brief are all 
premised on the assumption that there was a court order regarding 
her support obligation, so no further response to them is required 
in light of the State's position on this point. 
POINT,FOUR 
MODIFICATION OF A COURT-ORDERED SUPPORT OBLIGATION MAY NOT BE 
MADE IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS. 
The State agrees with appellant on this point. The State 
disagrees with appellant's contention, however, that there is 
a court-ordered support obligation in this case. 
POINT FIVE 
MODIFICATION OF AN EXISTING SUPPORT OBLIGATION MAY NOT BE IMPOSED 
RETROACTIVELY, BUT ONLY PROSPECTIVELY. 
The State agrees with appellant on this point. The State 
disagrees with appellant's contention, however, that there is 
a court-ordered support obligation in this case. 
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CQNC^USION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, the State asks the Court 
to affirm the Order of the District Court. If this court determines 
that the District Court's Order should be reversed, then the 
administrative action taken herein by the Department of Social 
Services should be set aside and the Department should be allowed 
to proceed in the courts for any relief it seeks, using any 
available legal theory. 
DATED this (l day of March, 1987. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
BLAINERTFERGUSOS 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE,OF SERVICE 
I certify that I hand-delivered four copies of this Brief 
to Utah Legal Services, Inc., c/o Louisa L. Baker, Attorney 
for Petitioner/Appellant, at 124 South 400 East, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111, this l9 day of March, 1987. 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT 
UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-1 to 13 
(1953), as amended 
MARSHA LEE HUTCHINSON VS. JOHN COLLINS 
HUTCHINSON. Decree of Divorce, Third 
District Court, State of Utah, 
June 15, 1972 B 
ORDER 
Third District Court, State of Utah 
August 29, 1986 C 
(Respondent a l s o r e l i e s on the documents contained 
in the Addendum to appe l lan t ' s b r i e f . ) 
(Please Note: The Decree of Divorce (Exhibit "B") is 
also contained in the Addendum to appellant's brief. 
However, it is included here because appellant's copy 
inadvertently cuts off the bottom line on the first 
page.) 
Chapter 45. Uniform Civil Liability for 
Support Act 
7MS-1. Short title. 
7MS-2 Definitions. 
7MS-3. Doty of mm. 
71-45-4. Duly of womii . 
7M54.1 Duty of stepparent to tapport stepchild -
Effect of termination of marriage or commoi law 
relationship. 
7M54.2. Natural or adoptive parent sat primary 
obligation of tapport • Right of stepparent to recover 
tapport. 
7W5-4.3. Ward of ttatc - Primary obligation to 
tapport. 
7S-45-S Duty of obligor regardleas of presence or 
residence of obligee. 
7 M 5 4 . District coart Jurisdiction. G 
71-45-7. Determination of amoaat of tapport - ^ 
Astestmeaf formula for temporary tapport. M 
7M5-7.I . Medical aad dental etpeatet of dependent £* 
chlldrea • Assigning rrspootiblliiy for payment • t-g 
Insurance coverage. 
7 I 4 M , Continuing Jurisdiction. £ 
7l«4J«t. Enforcement of right of tapport. *S 
7 I 4 M . I , Repealed. 
7*>45-*.2. County attorney to assist obligee. 
7S-45-I0 Appeals. 
71-45-11. Husband and wife privileged communication 
inapplicable • Competency of spouses. 
7M5-12. Rights are In addition to those presently 
existing. 
71-45-13. Interpretation and construction. 
r«C ANNOTATION consult the UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 341 
78-45-1. Judicial Code UTAH CODE I9S6-I9S7 
78-45-1. Short tide. 
This act may be cited as the Uniform Civil Liab-
ility for Support Act. t«S7 
71-45-2. Definitions. 
As used in this act: 
(1) •State" includes any state, territory or posse-
ssion of the United States, the District of Columbia 
and the Commonwealth of Pueno Rico. 
(2) 'Obligor' means any person owing a duty of 
support. 
(3) 'Obligee* means any person to whom a duty 
of support is owed. 
(4) "Child' means a son or daughter under the 
age of 18 years and a son or daughter of whatever 
age who is incapacitated from earning a living and 
without sufficient means. 
(5) 'Parent" includes a natural parent, an adop-
tive parent, or a stepparent. 
(6) 'Stepparent' means a person ceremonially 
married to a child's natural or adoptive custodial 
parent who is not the child's natural or adoptive 
parent or one living with the natural or adoptive 
parents as a common law spouse, whose common 
law marriage was entered into in a state which rec- ] 
ognizes the validity of common law marriages. 
(7) 'Stepchild' means any child with a stepparent. 
(8) 'Earnings' means compensation paid or 
payable for personal services, whether denominated 
as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or otherwise, 
and specifically include periodic payment pursuant 
to pension or retirement programs, or insurance 
policies of any type. Earnings shall specifically 
include all gain derived from capital, from labor, or 
from both combined, including profit gained 
through sale or conversion of capital assets. itu 
78-45-3. Duty of nan. 
Every man shall support his child; and he shall 
support his wife when she is in need. itn 
78-45-4. Duly of woman. 
Every woman shall support her child; and she 
shall support her husband when he is in need. itsi 
78*45-4.1 Duty of stepparent to support stepchild 
* Effect of termination of marriage or common 
law relationship. 
A stepparent shall support a stepchild to the same 
extent that a natural or adoptive parent is required 
to support a child. Provided, however, that upon 
the termination of the marriage or common law 
relationship between the stepparent and the child's 
natural or adoptive parent the support obligation 
shall terminate. two 
78-45-4.2. Natural or adoptive parent has 
primary obligation of support - Right of 
stepparent to recover support. 
Nothing contained herein shall act to relieve the 
natural parent ot adoptive parent of the primary 
obligation of support; furthermore, a stepparent has 
the same right to recover support for a stepchild 
from the natural or adoptive parent as any other 
oblige*. i t " 
78-45-4.3. Ward of s u i t • Primary obligation lo 
•rpport. 
Notwithstanding section 78-45*2, a natural or 
an adoptive parent or stepparent whose minor child 
has become a ward of the state is not relieved of the 
primary obligation to support that child until he 
reaches the age of majority. isu 
71-45-5. Doty of obligor regardless of presence or 
resideoce of obligee. 
An obligor present or resident in this state has the 
duty of support as defined in this act regardless of 
3 4 2 Nr ANNOTATIONS, please coati 
the presence or residence of the obligee. i*$7 
78-45-6. District court jurisdiction. 
The district court shall have jurisdiction of all 
proceedings brought under this act. tfS7 
78-45*7. Determination of amount of support • 
Assessment formula for temporary support. 
(1) Prospective support shall be equal to the 
amount granted by prior court order unless there 
has been a material change of circumstance on the 
part of the obligor or obligee. 
(2) When no prior court order exists, or a mate-
rial change in circumstances has occurred, the court 
in determining the amount of prospective support, 
shall consider all relevant factors including but not 
limited to: 
(a) the standard of living and situation of the 
parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the 
parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the need of the obligee; 
(f) the age of the parties; 
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for the 
support of others. 
(3) When no prior court order exists, the cpuft 
shall determine and assess all arrearages based upon, 
but not limited to: 
(a) the amount of public assistance received by 
the obligee, if any; 
(b) the funds that have been reasonably and 
necessarily expended in support of spouse and chil-
dren. 
(4) In determining the amount of prospective 
support on an ex parte or other motion for tempo-
rary support, the court shall use a uniform statewide 
assessment formula, adjusted for regional differe-
nces, prior to rendering the support order. The 
formula shall provide for all relevant factors which 
can be readily identified and shall allow for reaso-
nable deductions from the obligor's earnings for 
taxes, work related expenses, and living expenses. 
The assessment formula shall be established by the 
Department of Social Services and periodically rev-
iewed by the Judicial Council under Subsection 78-
3-21(3). rtM 
78-45-7.1. Medical and dental expenses of 
i dependent children - Assigning responsibility for 
payment - Insurance coverage. 
When no prior court order exists or the prior 
court order makes no specific provision for the 
payment of medical and denial expenses for depen-
dent children, the court shall include in its order a 
provision assigning responsibility for the payment of 
reasonable and necessary medical and dental expe-
nses for the dependent children. If coverage is ava-
ilable at a reasonable cost, the court may also 
include a provision requiring the purchase and 
maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and 
dental care insurance for those children. tfu 
78-45-8. Continuing jurisdiction. 
The court shall retain jurisdiction to modify or 
vacate the order of support where justice requires. 
itsi 78-45-9. Enforcement of right of support. 
(I) The obligee may enforce his right of support 
against the obligor and the state department of 
social services may proceed pursuant to this act or 
any other applicable statute, either on its own behalf 
or on behalf of the obligee, to enforce the obligee's 
right of support against the obligor. Whenever any 
court action is commenced by the state department 
the UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 5 £ . T J S ! 
VTA* CODE - . . . 
\n±\w Judic iB 
of social services to enforce payment of the 
obliftot's support obligation, \\ shall to the duty of 
the attorney genera) or the county attorney, of the 
county of residence of the obligee, to represent that 
department. 
(2) No obligee shall commence any action to 
recover support due or owing that obligee whether 
under this act or any other applicable statute 
without first filing an affidavit with the court at the 
time the action is commenced stating whether that 
obligee has received public assistance from any 
source if the obligee has received public assistance, 
the obligee shall join the department of social serv-
ices as a party plaintiff in the action. The depart-
ment of social services shall be represented as pro-
vided in subsection (1) of this section. IIM 
7MS4 .1 . Repealed. lit* 
7IU5-9.2. County attorney to assist obligee. 
The county attorney's office shall provide assist-
ance to an obligee desiring to proceed under this act 
in the following manner: 
(I) Provide forms, approved by the Judicial 
council of Utah, for an order of wage assignment if 
the obligee is not represented by legal counsel; 
(J) The county attorney's office may charge a fee 
not to exceed $23 for providing assistance to an 
obligee under subsection (1). 
1$) Worn* the obligee of the right to file unpec-
uniouily if the obligee is unable to bear the expenses 
of the action and assist the obligee with such filing; 
(4) Advise the obligee of the available methods 
for service of process; and 
(5) Assist the obligee in expeditiously scheduling a 
hearing before the court. twj 
7M3-10. Appeals. 
Appeals may be taken from orders and judgments 
under this act as in other civil actions. i*S7 
7 M 5 - U . Husband and wife privileged 
communication inapplicable - Competency of 
spouses. 
taws attaching a privilege against the disclosure 
of communications between husband and wife are 
inapplicable under this act. Spouses are competent 
witnesses to testify to any relevant matter, including 
marriage and parentage. tm 
7 M M 2 . Rights art In addition to those 
presently existing. 
The rights herein created are in addition to and 
noi in substitution to any other rights. its*? 
71-45-13. Interpretation and construction. 
This act shall be so interpreted and construed as 
to cfiectuate its general purpose to make uniform 
the lau of those stales which enact it. its7 
A t t o r n e y f o r P l a i n t i f f *•**-'* ^
 c > ^ ^ 
60C Utaji S a v i n g s B u i l d i n g ** -*y f*j/j?" c - ^» 
. S a l t L a k e C i t y , U t a h 8 4 1 1 1 
T e l e p h o n e : 3 6 4 - 3 6 2 5 
'* + + +* + + ± + * + + + + + -*+* + + + + * + + * + + + + + + + + + + + + + ii + + + + m + + m m 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIPD JUDICAL DISTRICT, 
IN A N D FOR S A L T L A K E C O U N T Y , S T A T E O F U T A H 
MARSHA LEE HUTCHINSON, • £ -£# ~9& - f'Sf A.H. 
plaiuiff. : " ' 
: D E C R E E OF D I V O R C E 
- v o - : 
JOHN COLLINS HUTCHINSON, - C i v i l N o . D - 6 4 5 5 
defendant. : 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
This cause having come on regularly for hearing on the 9th day of June 
1972 before the honorable Emmctt L. Brown with plaintiff being present and 
represented by counsel, defendant not present nor represented by counsel, the 
Court taking notice of more than 90 days elapsed since filing of plaintiffs 
complaint and defendant's being duly served with process having failed to 
respond to this action in the time allowed by law, defendant's default was duly 
entered. Plaintiff being ..worn and from her testimony adduced the Court being 
fully advised in the premises having made and entered its Findings of Facts 
and Conclusionsof Law; now on motion of Leland K. Wimmer, i t i s h e r e b y 
O R D E R E D , A D J U D G E D nd D E C R E E D : 
1. That plaintiff be and she is awarded divorce from defendant and each of 
the parties is restored to the status of an unmarried person freed from their 
bons of matrimony, provided however, . that this decree shall not become 
final and absolute until the expiration of three months from date of signing by 
judge and entry hereof, provided further, that this decree shall become final 
and absolute upon said expiration of three months unless the appeal is pending 
or the Court upon its own motion or application of any other person, whether 
interested or nd otherwise orders. 
3, Plaintiff be and hhe is awarded the sole CARE, CUSTODY and CONTROL 
of Diana Michele Hutchinson, horn January 2. 1967, and John Collins Hutchinson, 
born April 29, 1969, subject to rights of defendant to »'isit said children at 
reasonable t imes ;md places in accordance with their ages and his faci l i t ies . ^ * 
3. Plaintiff is awarded judgment against defendant who is rdered to pay to 
II 
the sum of $1^0. 00 per month as alimony for the plaintiff for a total of $220. 00 
each month payable through the office of the Salt Lake County Clerk, Support 
<> and Alimony division, at the rate of $110. 00 on the 20th day of June 1972, 
t! 
H $110. 00 on the 5th day of July, $110. 00 on the 20th dav of July 1972 and simi!'ir 
amounts on the 5th and 20th of each month thereafter. 
I 4. Plaintiff be and she i s awarded as her sole and separate property the 
1961 Ford Falcon, all furniture, appliances, furnishings and effects which are 
;»' in her personal possess ion and control. 
i 
I' 
r 5. Defendant be and he i s awarded as his sole and separate property the 
ji 1945 Dodge Pickup, his fishing and hunting equipment and his personal effects. 
M 
!, 6. Plaintiff be and she is awarded against defendant an additional judgment 
j in the sum of $250. 00 as attorney fees for the e s e and benefit of her attorney 
j herein together with judgment in the sum of $6. 60 for costs of Court and 
specifically reserving the judgment of $75.00 as temporary attorneys fees for 
the Order To Show Cause hearing. 
7, Plaintiff i s awarded against defendant funher judgment in the amount of 
$300. 00 as arrears of temporary child support and alimony in this matter. 
8. Defendant is ordered to pay and discharge and hold harmless the plaintiff 
form all such obligations end indebtedness of the family incurred during the 
marriage including by not limited to Granite Furnit ire Company, Sugarhouse 
Appliance Co. , J2ETNA loan Company and Lincoln Loan Company. 
D a t e d t h i s 1 5 t h d a y of J u n e A . D . 1 9 7 2 . 
By t h e C o u r . t v •*,*.. ATTEST 
* . 0TEBUNG EVXNB 
CLSSlK 
i n . 1 hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of ihe foregoing Decree 
|*U1AH )
 g 8 ofDivorettodefendant, John Collins Hutchinson, 1243G&rne*te* S t r e e t , SaltLake 
:NW OF SALT LAKE ) City, Utah 84116, this 15th day of June 1972. 
T l « UNDERSIGNED, CLERK OF THE DISTRICT rf 
I R f F SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH, CO HV r^DY ^ H W T ^ 
TIM THAT THE ANNEXED AND FOREGOING IS ^ / V O 
RIBAND FULL COPY CF AN ORIGINAL DOCU- / ^ " ^ ~~7 
I T » FILE IN MY OFFICE AS SUCH CLERK. 
ITW5S ytf HAND AND SEAV OF SAID CQURT 
3AY OF , 
. *> CLERK 
DEPUTT 
T < * <£ I * ;u ' -
ijLijyyitu 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
BLAINE R. FERGUSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
3195 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841 15 
Telephone: 4 8 3 - 6 3 J 3 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
AUG 2 9 1986 
H. Dixon Hindiey. Clerk 3rd Dist. Court 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE C0UN1Y, STATE OF UTAH 
MARSHA LEE STARKS, aka 
MARSHA LEE BEACHLER, 
Petitioner/Defendant 
vs.* 
STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT 
OF SOCIAL SERVICES, 
Respondent/Plaintiff 
ORDER 
civil No. C83-8696 
Juoge Hanson 
The aDove matter came before this court pursuant to a 
Petition for Review fileu by tno Petitioner/Defendant herein, Marsha 
Lee StarKS, in which, unoer Section 78-4bb-6.1, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amendea, she sought jucicial review of the Findings and 
Oroer of the Department of Social Services for the State of Utah in 
case #9 0 0 9 y a 8 2 R l . The parties having filea memoranaa in support of 
their respective positions in the matter and having filed the record 
and all other papers necessary and proper in the premises, and the 
court having carefully reviewed tne same and being fully advised, 
ana good cause appearing, now, tnerefore: 
IT is HEREBY ORDERED that the Findings of Fact and 
Coneibftlbhi of Lew of the Administrative Law Judge dated November 8, 
1583 and the Order of the Department of Social Services datea 
November k3, 1983, which Order is represented by an abstract of 
EXHIBIT "C" 
• ward dated December 6, 1983 (Civil Case No. 24)1-709), are affirmed 
in every respect, and the parties are oroered to comply with the 
same. 
DATEO this £?j day of (M/rrfA*lStr 1*86. 
.'iMOlHY' R. HANSON 
/District Court Juoge 
A i ! t. 
& 
il/t>pt>ty 0 * * > 
MAILING U R U F I U T E 
I certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Order to 
the following persons at the following addresses, postage prepaid, 
this
 sftf* da> of J u 1 > » 1986: 
Leland K. Wimmer 
Attorney for Petitioner/Defendant 
604 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Ss&Z/S 
L ^ srfirC. 
